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Throughout this brief, plantiffs and appellants will 
be referred to as plaintiffs, and defendants and respond-
ents will be referred to as defendants. All italics are 
ours. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal arises out of an action con11nenced by 
four salesmen against a real estate broker for pay1nent. 
of compensation for the sale of houses located in the 
:J;forning Side Heights Subdivision. 
The case \vas tried to a jury and on November 2f>, 
1953 it returned a verdict as follows (R. 230) : 
On behalf of Scott Anderson __________________________ $987.50 
On behalf of Earl M. Baker ____________________ · ________ 225.00 
On behalf of Earl J. Knudson ________________________ 718.75 
On behalf of Fred R. Shepherd______________________ 831.25 
Judgment was entered on the verdict. On the 15th day of 
Dece1nber, 1953, the Honorable Ray \Tan Cott, Jr., 
granted a motion vacating and setting aside the judgment 
and ordered that judgment he entered for defendants 
against plaintiffs "no cause of action" (R. 237). 
This appeal is prosecuted so that this Court can 
determine from the record whether or not there was 
evidence to support the verdict of the jury. 
The complaint originally set forth a cause of action 
based on a 55% of 5% of the sales price of the homes sold 
by plaintiffs while employed by defendants. After the 
first day of trial, it appeared from the evidence pre-
sented by plaintiffs that there had been a 1nodification 
of the usual standard employment agreement between the 
real estate salesmen and broker. It was plaintiffs' posi-
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3 
tion that their assent to this 1nodified arrangement was 
obtained by fraud and concealment and overreaching by 
the defendants. However, the court ruled that he would 
not permit plaintiffs to recover on the theory of fraudu-
lent concealment and ruled, which rule became the law 
of the case, that plaintiffs could only recover on the 
basis of the 1nodifica tion even though the modification 
\vas obtained through fraud and overreaching. This 
ruling was 1nade known to the jury on the rnorning of 
the second day of trial at approximately 11 :15 and is 
contained in a state1nent made by the court (R. 109). 
At the same time, the court ruled that the plaintiffs 
could file an amended cornplaint to conform to the proof 
which they were presenting and had presented. The 
amended complaint was prepared and filed during the 
trial and upon the arnended complaint the trial proceeded 
(R. 5). 
The amended con1plaint was based on the theory 
that plaintiffs had agreed to sell the hon1es in the Morn-
ing Side Heights Subdivision at $100.00 per house. 
Wright-Wirthlin had failed, neglected and refused to 
pay the $100.00 per house but had paid only a portion of 
the $100.00 per house. 
The evidence shows that all of the plaintiffs were 
salesmen for the defendant brokerage; that in the early 
part of May, 1950, the brokerage negotiated an agreement 
with Felt Syndicate, Inc., which document is entitled 
Sales Agency Agreement and is Exhibit 4. The agree-
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ment is dated the 11th day of ~Iay, 1950. The ter1ns of 
this agreement were not made know·n to the plaintiffs. 
Defendants did not divulge to plaintiffs the a1nounts 
the brokerage was receiving as comrnission. Throughout 
the sales campaign, defendants did not reveal to or in 
any way make known to plaintiffs the contents of the 
Sales Agency Agreement. Even at the ti1ne of trial, 
defendants did everything in their pow~r to prevent the 
contents of the Sales Agency Agree1nent, Exhibit 4, fro1n 
being revealed to the court and jury. It will be noted 
that in the examination of defendant Wirthlin, counsel 
for defendants refused to put into evidence a copy of 
the Sales Agency Agree1nent even though counsel for 
plaintiffs repeatedly objected to examination concerning 
the contents of the written instrument (R. 146, 147, 148). 
Plaintiffs were only able to get into evidence the Sales 
Agency Agreement after the direct examination of 1\tfr. 
Wirthlin was finished (R. 164). This refusal by defend-
ants to reveal to plaintiffs the exact working arrange-
ment with F'elt Syndicate, Inc., was one of the bases for 
plaintiffs' original claim that there had been a fraudu-
lent concealment and overreaching. However, it being 
the law of the case that plaintiffs could not recover more 
than $100.00 per house, the plaintiffs proceeded on the 
theory imposed upon them by the court's ruling. 
It 'vas undisputed by all of the parties that Wright-
'Virthlin agreed to pay each of the plaintiffs $100.00 
per house which plaintiffs sold. It 'vas further undis-
puted that a large number of houses 'vere sold. Exhibit 
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No. 3, prepared by defendants, sho,vs the exact number 
accredited to each of the plaintiffs. ~[r. vVirthlin and 
all of the sales1nen testified that not one of the sales 
accomplished by the plaintiffs back-fired (R·. 177). Every 
buyer perfor1ned under the agreement "\vhich the plain-
tiffs obtained. The purchasers "\Vere required to sign 
Earnest :nioney Receipts and Agreements, a copy of the 
form used is Exhibit 1. The Sales Agency Agreement 
provided as follows: 
"3. A sale is to be considered made and the 
comn1ission earned when a purchaser has been 
obtained 'vho has signed a contract for th·e pur-
chase of the lot and home to be built upon the lot, 
and such purchaser's application for a loan to 
either the Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association or the Prudential Insurance Company 
has been approved, and the mortgage recorded. 
In the event a purchaser fails and refuses to go 
forward and forfeits the earnest money payment, 
such sum so forfeited will be applied first to pay-
ment of loan costs, and the remainder shall be 
divided equally between the First Party and 
Second Party, and in such event no additional 
commission shall be charged." 
Exhibit 1, the Earnest 1foney Receipt and Agree-
ment, contains a provision that the loaning institution, 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association, would 
pay out the down payment made by the purchaser and 
the proceeds of the loan at certain percentages as the 
housing construction progressed. 
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The Sales Agency Agreen1ent, Exhibit 4, provided 
for payment to Wright-Wirthlin of the $300.00 couunis-
sion. The brokerage was to receive this couunission at 
certain stages of construction. Paragraph 2 of said agree-
ment contains the following language: "This sales conl-
mission is to he paid on the same percentage dra-\v basis 
as other items are paid through the disbursal during the 
progress of the construction progran1." 
The houses which were sold by plantiffs were con-
structed. During the construction, the contractor beca1ne 
unable to proceed with the construction project. Felt 
Syndicate, Inc. likewise failed. When Felt failed, it 
transferred and assigned to Wright-"\Virthlin twelve 
options to purchase lots and received for the transfer a 
credit of $150.00 per lot on the amounts due and owing 
from Felt to Wright-Wirthlin. This transfer of lots in 
partial satisfaction of the Wright-Wirthlin claim was 
done without the knowledge of or the consent of plain-
tiffs. F'elt also assigned to the defendants all of the 
funds which they had coming from Prudential Federal 
under the contracts covering the construction of Morning 
Side Heights (R. 192, 194). This assignment placed in 
the hands of the broker all of the rights of Felt to funds 
payable under its contract. Defendants received in cash 
and credit on the options for the twelve lots a total of 
$14,590.74 (Exhibit 2). They paid out of said sum to all 
salesmen, including plaintiffs, approximately $5400.00, 
or approximately 54% of the amount which the salesmen 
earned. In the amount thus credited, Wrigh't-Wirthlin 
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7 
refused to g1ve credit for the profits which they made 
from the options received from Felt. Nor, have defend-
ants taken into account the value of the lawsuit which 
they have against the bonds on the construction job and 
the assign1nent "vhich they received fron1 Felt for its 
share of the miscellaneous fund account. 
Defendants informed the sales1nen, including these 
plaintiffs, that payments of their commission would be 
at the same rate as the construction draws were made as 
the house construction project progressed. The salesmen 
testified that they looked to defendants for the payment 
of their $100.00 (R. 66, 69, 113 and 115). At no time were 
the plaintiffs informed of the negotiations between 
Wright-Wirthlin and Felt nor were the salesmen offered 
any part of the consideration which was in the form of 
lots and assign1nent of funds. No accounting was ever 
given to the salesmen during the time that they worked 
for defendants. Not until after this suit was filed against 
defendants for their compensation was any accounting 
made. 
It was freely admitted that defendants did not keep 
track of the various stages of construction of the houses 
sold by the individual salesmen. Nor did Wright-Wirthlin 
attempt to pay to each salesman his share of the draws 
which were made on the houses which he sold (R·. 213 to 
215). Plaintiffs repeatedly demanded payment from 
defendants and were always given the story that the 
monies had not been collected. 
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The houses 'vere all occupied by the buyers. ':rhe 
n1oney for the construction of the ho1nes 'vere paid in 
full by Prudential Federal. These funds, as was indi-
cated by the Sales Agency Agreement, were to be paid 
out at the various stages of construction. The funds were 
paid out to the last dollar (R. 169, 170). However, G.I. 
approval was not obtained on the homes and as a con-
sequence the Prudential Federal Inortgages have not 
been given a Veterans' Adn1inistration guarantee (R. 
167). The failure of the V.A. to guarantee the mortgages 
"\vas based upon its refusal to approve the ho1nes ( R. 172). 
At the close of all the evidence, the court instructed 
the jury orally (R. 223). Neither plaintiffs nor defend-
ants are here complaining about the instructions. The 
instructions fairly and fully submitted the factual propo-
sitions covered by the evidence 'vhich the jury was 
required to pass upon. 
Instruction No. 4 sets forth the crucial proposition 
upon which the jury was required to pass. It reads as 
follows, (R. 225) : 
"Instruction No. 4. Before you can find these 
defendants are liable you 1nust find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that there was a con-
tract entered into by them with these plaintiffs 
whereby they rendered themselves personally 
liable as defendants to the plaintiffs for the pay-
Inent of these commissions." 
Upon the quoted instruction the jury necessarily found 
in' favor of the plaintiffs. The evidence fully justified 
such a finding. 
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S1.,_.\ TEniENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDEN.CE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANTS WERE PERSONALLY LIABLE TO 
PLAINTIFFS FOR THE $100.00 PER HOUSE COMMISSION. 
_A_RGUl\!ENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDEN.CE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANTS WERE PERSONALLY LIABLE TO 
PLAINTIFFS FOR THE $100.00 PER HOUSE COMMISSION. 
rllhere \vas no dispute jn the evidence concerning the 
I 
basic facts and dealings between plaintiffs and defend-
ants. The exhibits and the testin1ony did not conflict in 
very rnany particulars. Where there \Vere conflicts, they 
\\'"ere of a minor nature. 
The fundarnental problern presented by the evidence 
w-as one of interpretation. The interpretation and signifi-
cance of conduct on the part of plaintiffs and defendants 
and the rneaning of the \Vritten instrurnents vvere pre-
~ented for the jury's consideration. Plaintiffs subn1it 
that such interpretation is the perrogative of the jury 
and is a part of the function \\~hich the Constitution of 
the State of l ~tah requires that they be perrnitted to 
perforrn. 
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There is no dispute between plaintiff~ and defend-
ants concerning the fact that the proposition \Ya~ ~nh­
nlitted to the jury by the court's instruction. A re-exaini-
nation of those instructions by this court \Yill indicatP~ 
plaintiffs feel sure, that the proposition was fairly, con-
cisely and clearly subn1itted to the jury by th·e court'~ 
instructions. 
The verdict was in plaintiffs' behalf. The ruling by 
the trial court which entirely disregarded and set asidr 
the jury's verdict could only be justified if there \Vas no 
evidenee which supported the verdict found by the jury. 
This rule of la\v is so clear and undisputed that no 111ore 
than a few cases \vill be cited to support it. 
Until the ne\v rules of civil procedure were adopted, 
under Utah law, a trial court could not entertain a n1otion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Buhler r. 
Maddison, 105 Utah 39, 140 P. 2d 933; Kirk t·. Salt Lake 
City, 32 lTtah 143, 89 P. 458, 12 A.L.R., N.S. 1021. Rule 
50 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for con-
sideration of a 1notion to set aside the judgment entered 
on a verdict. In Morby v. Rogers, ______ Utah ______ (1953)~ 
252 P. 2d 231, p. 232, this Court stated the rule for 1Ttah 
as follows: 
"It is well settled that in order for a court 
to grant a request for a directed verdict or for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict grounded 
on non-negligence of defendant, the record must 
disclose no evidence against the party so request-
ing upon which reasonable minds could find him 
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guilty of the negligence charged. The issue here, 
then, was whether the record disclosed any evi-
dence upon which the jury could have found the 
appellant guilty of negligence." 
The Federal cases have interpreted Rule 50 (b) and 
the guide set up there would apply in Utah. In Binder 
c. Conunercial Travelers Mut. ~Jcc . .._4ss'n., 165 F. 2d 896, 
p. 901, the Necond Circuit Court ;stated the rule as fol-
lo\vs: 
~·In setting aside the verdict as against the 
~weight' of the evidence, \Ve think the district 
judge resorted to a for1nula \vhich is no longer 
(if it ever was) appropriate. The discussions in 
the opinions in Galloway v. lTnited States, 319 
U.S. 372, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458, show that 
it is the jury's, not the court's, function to weigh 
the evidence, and it is only \vhere there is lacking 
any evidence of substance upon which reasonable 
1nen could reach the result represented by the 
verdict that a judge 1nay interfere." 
.A .. n1ore co1nplete staten1ent of the rule with authori-
ties is found in Frabutt r. }l cu: 1·· ork, C. & St. L. R. Co., 
88 F. Supp. 821, p. 825, \vhere J'udge ( iourley says: 
'"In passing upon a n1otion to set aside a 
verdict for plaintiff and to enter judgrnent for the 
defendant, evidence including all reasonable in-
ferences to be drawn therefrom must be taken in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all 
conflicts must be resolved in his favor. \Vagga-
Inan v. General Finance Co. of Philadelphia, Pa., 
Inc., 3 Cir., 116 F.2d 25-l:; Schad et al v. Twentieth 
Century-Fox Fihn Corp. et al., 3 Cir., 136 F.2d 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
991; Lukon v. Pennsylvania R.. Co., :~ Cir., 1 :n 
F.2d 327; ~Ieyonberg v. Pennsylvania R. Co., ;~ 
Cir., 165 F.2d 50; Kraus v. Reading Co., 3 Cir., 
167 F.2d 313; O'Brien v. Public Service rraxi ( ~o., 
3 Cir ., 178 F .2d 211. 
The court cannot concern itself with th~ 
credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the 
evidence. Roth ·r·. Swanson, 8 Cir., 145 F.2d 262. 
The court is not free to reweigh the evidence 
and set aside the jury's verdict merely because 
the jury could have drawn different inferences or 
conclusions, or because the court regards another 
result as n1ore reasonable. Tennant v. Peoria & 
P. U. Ry. Co., 321 lT.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 I.J.Ed. 
520. 
Where uncertainty as to the existence of 
negligence arises from a conflict in the testimony, 
or because, the facts being undisputed, fair-
minded men will honestly draw different conclu-
sions from the1n, the question is not one of la\\T 
but of fact to be settled by the jury. Gunning v. 
Cooley, 281 lT.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 7 4 L.Ed. 
720." 
The Sales Agency Agreement, Exhibit 4, required 
the payment of $300.00 commission. Defendants were 
entitled to be paid the commission as the houses \vere 
constructed. It contains unequivicallangua.ge as follow·s: 
"* * * this sales commission is to be paid on the same 
percentage draw basis as other i terns are paid through 
the dis bursal during the progress of construction pro-
gram." It is undisputed that the percentages were paid 
in their entirety and that all of the funds provided for 
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the construction of the :.Jiorning Side lieights' homes 
haYe been disbursed. Defendants are entitled to their 
$300.00 per house conunission since all of the funds avail-
able for the construction of the houses have been paid 
and that is the condition upon \vhich the sales corninis-
sion i8 to be paid. Plaintiffs therefore submit that they 
are entitled to their $100.00 per house from defendants. 
The evidence in its light n1ost favorable to the plain-
tiffs requires that regardless of any agreernents defend-
ants rnay have had with F'elt, they \vere entitled to their 
$100.00 per house as an absolute proposition. 
The basic and funda1nental proposition which de-
fendants are atte1npting to have this Court sustain is 
that plaintiffs rnust be required to assume the risk that 
the defendants do not collf~ct the funds due them under 
the Sales Agency Agree1nent. Plaintiffs submit, to re-
quire them to do so \vould be grossly inequitable, unfair 
and not in accordance with plaintiffs' understanding nor 
even as conte1nplated by defendants. 
To illustrate the unfairness of defendants' proposi-
tion, consider the follo\ving \vhich are shown by the 
evidence: 
1. None of the plaintiffs were parties to the 
Sales Agency Agreement. 
·J None of the plaintiffs knew of the terms of 
the Sales Agency Agreement. 
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3. None of the plaintiff~ kne\\~ of thP alllount of 
commissions w·hich defendants \vere rereivinp; and 
had, therefore, no basis for passing on the fair-
ness of the contract. 
4. Plaintiffs were not infor1ned of the parties to 
the Sales Agency Agreement nor to \vhon1 defend-
ants were looking for the pa~~ment of the connni~­
sions \Yhich were earned. 
5. All of the negotiations, collections and pro-
cedures by defendants were taken \vithout con-
sultation between defendants and plaintiffs. 
6. Defendants reeeived and aeeepted property 
and agreed to delay the payments under the ~ales 
Agency Agreement terms without eonsulting \rith 
plaintiffs. 
7. Defendants own and \vill have all the benefit~ 
of any causes of aetion or claiins which it is suc-
cessful in pursuing against Felt Syndieate, Pru-
dential Federal or the bonds of Cassidy, the con-
struction contractor. 
8. Defendants will be per1nitted to retain av-
proximately $9,190.74 out of the $14,590.74 \vhich 
they have eollected, plus all of tlie profits which 
they have received from the sale of the twelve lots, 
options to which they received from Felt 8yndi-
cate and thus profit tremendously without paying 
to the plain tiffs the amount which all agreed 
would be paid as consideration for the selling of 
the Morning Side Heights' homes. 
The proposition which defendants are attempting to 
foist on to the Court, and have to the present time suc-
cessfully foisted off on Judge \::an Cott, would require 
that employees assu1ne the risk that their employer col-
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lect all of his accounts receivable before they are entitled 
to be paid their salaries. Such a proposition is unknown 
in the annals of busines~ relations, it is a risk the 
en1ployer assu1nes and is paid for in the an1ount of his 
gross profit on sales. 
There is no dispute that plaintiffs rendered the 
services required of then1 and that binding and subsist-
ing sales contracts were entered into. Every duty re-
quired of the sales1nen \vas perfor1ned in full. The only 
thing \vhich was left undone in the co1nplete performance 
\\~as the collection fron1 Felt Syndicate of the agreed and 
earned sales co1nmission. 
Who should be saddled ,,~i th the loss suffered by 
reason of the failure to collect from Felt Syndicate-
the salesmen ,,,.ho had no contract with that group, or 
the broker \vho negotiated the contract and dealt with, 
negotiated \vith, and co1npro1nised with the Syndicate 1 
The ans\ver seems to be clear and unequivical and plain-
tiffs submit that no judgment other than a reversal of 
Judge \;--an Cott's granting of judg1nent notwithstanding 
the verdict can achieve a fair and equitable result in this 
case. 
The rules of interpretation and construction of con-
tracts has been repeatedly set forth in our Utah cases. 
It has al\vays been our la\v that if there is ambiguous 
language or language which is susceptible of more than 
one 1neaning, the 1neaning adopted is the one most favor-
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able to the person not using the language. 'rhe rirrnln-
stances and positions of the parties and the subject 
matter and all other surrounding facts are to be con-
sidered in finding th·e true intention of the parties. 'J1hi~ 
job of finding the language of the contract and thrn 
interpreting it is to be left to the jury. Penn Star Miniu.r1 
Co. v. Ly1n.an, 64 Utah 343, 231 P. 107; Jordan r. llladseu, 
et a.Z, 69 Utah 112, :2:52 P. 570; Fo.r FilJn Corporation r. 
Ogden Th,ea.tre Co._. 832 Utah 279, 17 P. 2d 294; Miffliu 
v. Shiki, 77 lTtah 190, 293 P. 1. The n1ost recent reitera-
tion of the rules for interpretation and construction i~ 
Read) v. Forced Un,derfiring Corp., 82 lJtah 529, 26 1>. 2d 
325, p. 327. There this Court stated as follows: 
"In construing the terrn 'net profits' as used 
in the contract, it is the duty of the court to con-
sider the language in connection with the condi-
tions and circumstances under which the partie~ 
were contracting and the relation which they sus-
tained to each other. _2 Elliott on Contracts, 77 -+. 
Where the language is mixed and susceptible 
of more than one construction, the court should 
attempt to place itself as nearly as possible in the 
situation of the parties to the contract at the time 
the agreernent was entered into, so that it 1nay 
view the circumstances as viewed by the parties 
themselves to be enabled to understand the lan-
guage used in the sense with which the parties 
used it. In order to accomplish this purpose it i;-; 
generally proper for the court to take notice of 
the surroundings and attendant circumstances and 
consider the language used in the light of such 
circumstances. Id., p. 791. 
* * * 
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1 t i~ a fa1niliar rule of construction that the 
language used 1nust be construed most strongly 
against the person using it. In this case, the con-
tract i8 in the forn1 of a letter written by the 
defendant corporation to the plaintiff in which 
they set out the terms of the e1nployment. It is 
their language used at a tin1e when no salaries 
vvere being paid and were apparently not in con-
templation of being paid. _.._\t that time, under 
the conditions surrounding the plaintiff, he could 
not be expected to anticipate the creation of the 
new expenses which, if allowed, -vvould 1nake mean-
ingless that part of the contract referring to net 
proceeds. The contract should be so construed as 
to require the payn1ent of co1n1nissions due the 
plaintiff upon the net proceeds of the Salt Lake 
division without deducting salaries voted to the 
directors as managers after the contract had been 
entered into." 
~.,ro1n the authorities eited, it \Yould appear that the 
function of the jury vvhere the existence of an agreement 
is denied is to first find vvhether or not there \Yas an 
agreement and second, it n1ust find the 1neaning of the 
agree1nent. The jury in this case under instructions 
~atisfactory to both partie~, found that there was an 
agree1nent, and further found that under that agreement 
there were certain sun1s due plaintiffs. The trial court 
in entering judg1nent against plaintiffs ignored this vei---
dict and usurped the function vvhich the Constitution 
requires he permit the jury to perform. 
Plaintiffs submit that the trial court's ruling should 
he set aside and the verdict of the jury should be ordered 
reinstated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs submit that the trial court has usurped 
the function of the jury and has unconstitutionally denied 
them the right to a jury trial and the result thereof. 
This Court should order the restoration of the judg1nent 
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants in accord-
ance with the jury's verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Counsel for Appellants 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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